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Markets, Morality, and the Media: The Election 
of 1884 and the Iconography of Progressivism 
Richard R. John 
The victory of Democrat Grover Cleveland over Republican James G. Blaine 
in the presidential election of 1884 is one of those events in U.S. history that 
once commanded broad attention but that has long since ceased to stir the 
blood. This was an epoch, after all, about which historians customarily play 
up the radical transformations being wrought by big business and downplay 
the influence of presidential administrations on public policy. In the conven-
tional narrative-familiar to contemporaries, and updated a half century later 
for a generation of New Dealers by the journalist-turned-popular historian 
Matthew Josephson-greedy "robber barons" called the shots, while unscru-
pulous "politicos" did their bidding. This big-business-centric narrative has 
proved remarkably durable and helps explain why generations of historians 
have-misleadingly, in my view-borrowed a phrase from Mark Twain and 
called the period between the end of Congressional Reconstruction in 1877 
and the emergence of the Progressive movement around 1900 the Gilded Age. 
To the extent that the 1884 election lives on in the collective imagination, 
it is largely on account of a single incident that occurred in a Republican rally 
in New York City during the :final, hectic week of the campaign. Exasperated 
by Blaine's Democratic opponents, an obscure pro-Blaine Presbyterian min-
ister castigated the Democrats as the party of "rum, Romanism, and rebel-
lion." Not until the following Sunday would Blaine issue a public statement 
disavowing the minister's derogatory characterization of the Catholic Church. 
By this time, the phrase had gone viral, galvanizing, if informed insiders can 
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be believed, thousands of Irish Catholics to switch their votes from Blaine to 
Cleveland. Cleveland's margin of victory over Blaine in New York State was 
razor-thin, a mere 1,047 votes out of 1.2 million ballots cast. Even so, the mar-
gin was large enough to give Cleveland the state's thirty-six electoral votes 
and, with them, the election. Historians have long challenged the calisal re-
lationship between the minister's remark and the election outcome. Yet, in 
the annals of electoral lore, it lives on as one the most disastrous gaffes in the 
history of American politics. , 
The significance of the 1884 election is not to be found in its denouement. 
Rather, it lies in the emergence of a small yet determined voting bloc during 
the election campaign and in the role of this bloc following Cleveland's vic-
tory on the promulgation of public policy. At the core of this bloc of voters 
were antimonopolist merchants troubled by the conduct of giant corporations 
and anti-Blaine Republicans outraged at the moral failings of the Republi-
can candidate. While this voting bloc existed in several northern and mid-
western states, it was particularly influential in New York, the country's media 
capital, the home of the largest port, and its most important financial center. 
The legacy of this voting bloc extended well beyond the 1880s. By forging an 
alliance with journalists emboldened by novel forms of visual storytelling, it 
helped lay the groundwork for the early twentieth-century Progressive move-
ment and the mid-twentieth-century administrative state. 
Of the various issues to agitate the electorate in 1884, few proved more 
enduring than the public outcry over railroad and telegraph "monopolies.'1 
The rapid expansion since the 1850s of a nationwide transportation and com-
munications network was one of the defining features of the age. Slowly yet 
decisively, the state-chartered corporation was supplanting the common-law 
proprietorship as the nation's dominant economic institution. While the emer-
gence of giant corporations had a seeming inexorability, corporate expansion 
did not go unopposed. For a small yet articulate group of self-styled antimo-
nopolists, the business practices of William H. Vanderbilt's New York Cen-
tral and Hudson River Railroad and Jay Gould's Western Union, the nation's 
largest telegraph network provider, posed a fundamental threat not only to 
commerce but also to the Republic. 
Antimonopolists objected less to the scale on which railroads and tele-
graphs operated than to their autonomy. Unconstrained by the regulatory 
mechanism of the market-a mechanism that, as all merchants knew, contin-
ued to regulate commerce on the high seas-these corporations had acquired 
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the economic power to set prices for the conveyance of people, goods, and 
information at high speeds throughout the vast American interior. 
Railroads and telegraph lines crossed state boundaries, making federal 
legislation a logical remedy. In the case of the telegraph, none was forthcom-
ing. Though Congress repeatedly debated federal telegraph legislation dur-
ing Cleveland's first administration, with the exception of an 1888 law 
outlawing the ownership of telegraph lines by land grant railroads (the An-
derson Act), none of this legislation found its way into law.1 In the case of the 
railroad, antimonopoly lawmakers were more successful. By the time Cleve-
land took office in 1885, Massachusetts and New York had already established 
state railroad commissi6ns: Massachusetts in 1869, New York in 1882. Emu-
lating their example, lawmakers in 1887 established the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to regulate the nation's railroad network. The ICC was 
not the first federal regulatory agency, having been preceded by the Post Of-
fice Department and the Patent Office. Yet it was the first federal agency to 
oversee an economic sector in which the corporation had supplanted the pro-
prietorship as the dominant mode of economic coordination. 
Presidential elections in the late nineteenth century are best understood 
not as single events, as it has become customary to characterize them today, 
but rather as an aggregation of individual state elections, each with its own 
peculiarities. The outcome, of course, was national-one candidate won the 
majority of the electoral votes, and with it the presidency. The process, how-
ever, was federal. A typical late nineteenth-century presidential election re-
volved aroUnd a distinctive array of often idiosyncratic issues that had their 
own state-specific dynamic. 
The great prize for party leaders was not the popular vote in the nation, 
but the popular vote in each individual state. Under the federal Constitution, 
the winning candidate needed a majority of the votes in the Electoral Col-
lege, in which every state was allocated a vote total that was equal to the num-
ber of its U.S. senators and representatives. In accordance with along-standing 
convention known as the "unit rule," the electoral votes of each state were 
awarded in a bloc to whichever candidate won a plurality of the state's pop-
ular vote. -Whoever won the largest number of electoral votes-which was usu-
ally, though not invariably, the candidate who also won the popular vote-won 
the election. 
As so often occurred in late nineteenth-century presidential campaigns, 
the 1884 election hinged on voting results in four states: Indiana, Connecticut, 
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New Jersey, and New York. The reason was simple. In each of these states, the 
electorate was more or less evenly divided between Democrats and Republi-
cans, malting it conceivable that, in a close election, the standard-bearer for 
either party might prevail. In a country that was as large and diverse as the 
United States, it might seem bizarre for a presidential election to be decided 
by such a relatively small number of voters. Yet that was how things worked 
in practice. Of these four states, none had more electoral votes than New 
York. In fact, New York, with thirty-six, had the largest nurµber of electoral 
votes of any state in the country. 
The outsized significance of New York in electoral politics was a by-product 
of the political compromises that an earlier generation of lawmakers had made 
to reunite the country following the Civil War. Terrified by the threat that 
ex-slaves posed to the political order, Democratic Party leaders had worked 
doggedly in the years since emancipation to deny them, and increasingly many 
pbor whites, their constitutionally mandated voting rights. This strategy had 
an unmistakably partisan rationale. The vast majority of ex-slaves were Re-
publican, and in several of the eleven southern states that had seceded dur-
ing the Civil War, the Republican Party depended on African American votes 
to win elections. It took hard work to make the South "solid": persuasion, in-
timidation, violence, and even outright murder were among the tools that 
Democratic Party leaders deployed. Nothing any Republican ward heeler did 
to suppress the turnout in Democratic-leaning districts in the burgeoning 
industrial cities of the North was remotely comparable to the systematic dis-
enfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of African Americans in the for-
mer Confederacy. 
In short, the electoral map was biased in favor of the Democrats, and 
with each passing year it became increasingly clear that there was precious 
little that ex-slaves, Republican Party leaders, or, for that matter, high-
1ninded ex-abolitionist civil rights activists could do about it.2 It was, thus, 
no accident that all of the four swing states were located in the North. Party 
competition was the most intense in that part of the country in which the 
Democratic Party had the least control over the levers of power. Had the 
Democrats not systematically blocked southern blacks from participating in 
electoral politics, New York's electoral votes would not have loomed so 
large. Blaine would have won several southern states and, with them, the 
election. Yet the Democrats had rigged the system, making New York's elec-
toral votes far more consequential than they would have been had the South 
been in play. 
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No seasoned political insider seriously doubted that once the final elec-
tion returns had been tallied New York's bloc of electoral votes would be 
awarded to either Cleveland or Blaine, and not to a third-party independent 
candidate. Yet it was far from obvious who would win over the large cohort 
of independent voters who held the balance of power. "For more than twelve 
years," declared one political insider in July 1884 in seconding Cleveland's 
presidential nomination, the most critical voting bloc in the state of New York 
was the "large unattached vote"-one hundred thousand strong-"which be-
longs to neither political organization," and which was far less inclined to vote 
for the candidate, or the party, than for the positions on issues the candidate 
had pledged to uphold. 3 ' 
The existence of such a large bloc of in~ependent voters thrust into prom-
inence two third-party candidates: John St. John and Benjamin F. Butler. 
St. John carried the standard for the Prohibition Party, Butler for the Green-
back Party and the Anti-Monopoly Party. 
St. John and Butler appealed to different segments of the electorate. St. 
John ran well among evangelicals in New York's upstate "burned-over dis-
trict," a voting bloc that, had St. John stood down, would almost certainly 
have gone heavily for Blaine. Many evangelicals yearned for a total ban on 
the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages and felt betrayed when Re-
publican Party leaders refused to incorporate into their platform a strongly 
worded prohibition plank introduced by Frances Willard's Woman's Chris-
tian Temperance Union.4 St. John shared the evangelicals' indignation and 
entered the race to protest the Republican Party's moral equivocation. 
Butler, in contrast, could be expected to siphon votes away frorp Cleve-
land, given his popularity among urban worldngmen, a constituency that typ-
ically voted Democratic, especially in New York City and Brooklyn.5 Party 
leaders understood all of this perfectly well and responded accordingly. Re-
publican operatives covertly funded Butler's campaign, while St. John's cam-
paign received financial support from the Democrats.6 
Butler's candidacy posed a particular challenge for Democrats, since he 
ran as a "fusion" candidate who had obtained the endorsement of two very 
different political blocs: the Greenback Party, an organization that drew the 
bulk of its support from midwestern farmers and laborers, and the Anti-
Monopoly Party, an organization with close ties to influential New York City 
merchants. 
The Anti-Monopoly Pa:rty had its beginnings in the rising protest of 
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corporations. One turning point occurred in January 1881, when the coun-
try's business elite was stunned by the unexpected takeover of Western 
Union by the notorious Wall Street trader jay Gould. Gould's gambit crys-
tallized the uneasiness that New York City's business elite felt toward :finan-
cial practices associated with the emerging corporate order. Now that Gould 
controlled the nation's most important high-speed communications net-
work, critics feared that he had it within his power to manipulate the prices 
not only of agricultural staples-and, conceivably, even tp_e price of gold-
but also of corporate securities.7 
Gould's takeover of Western Union led directly to the establishment of 
the New York City-based National Anti-Monopoly League, an organization 
that would quickly establish itself as a force in electoral politics. The league 
drew its primary support from merchants, wholesalers, shippers, and the law-
yers who represented their interests. 8 Its rationale, as founder Francis B. 
Thurber explained, was not to destroy the emerging corporate order, but rather 
to render it accountable to law: "Mr. Chairman and Fellow-citizens, the Anti-
Monopoly League stands simply upon the principles embodied in the Consti-
tution of the United States, and as interpreted by the highest legal authority in 
the United States-the Supreme Court. If this is radical, we are radical; if this 
is the action of demagogues and Communists, we are demagogues and Com-
munists, not otherwise."9 So fervent was Thurber in his denunciation of the 
railroads that one critic sardonically called him the "bottom, top, rind, and 
the core" of the antimonopoly movement in New.York.10 
The legislative agenda that Thurber championed was broad and wiiie-
ranging. Prominent among its goals was a ban on the informal agreements, 
known as pools, that railroad managers negotiated with each other to stabi-
lize the flow of the goods they transported. Thurber also sought a restriction 
on the issuance of corporate securities in amounts that exceeded the actual 
value of a corporation's assets, a practice known as stock watering, and the 
elimination of rate schedules that discriminated against shippers who wanted 
to transport a relatively small quantity of goods over a relatively short dis-
tance, as distinct from shippers who transported in bulk and over long hauls. 
Finally, Thurber hoped to persuade the New York legislature to establish a 
permanent railroad commission, with rate-setting powers, that could author-
itatively determine the actual cost of.transporting a given item a given dis-
tance in a given period of time, making it possible to base railroad rate maldng 
on the actual cost of delivery rather than on whatever rates the railroad could 
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obtain from the shipper, a practice that Thurber regarded as extortionate, and 
which he derisively termed "what the traffic will bear."11 
Thurber's antimonopolism was grounded in his business experience. A 
highly successful wholesale grocer, Thurber was the coproprietor of Thurber, 
Whyland & Company, a sprawling commercial erilpire whose opulent six.-
story showroom in lower Manhattan was reputed to boast the "largest, choic-
est, and most comprehensive stock of food products in America." (The building 
still stands today; it now houses luxury apartments.) Thurber was one of the 
country's leading specialists in the global supply chains upon which his busi-
ness depended, and filled his Manhattan showroom with exotic foodstuffs 
imported from East Asii and Europe as well as canned goods manufactured 
in his own Moorestown, New Jersey, factory.12 To build a market for his wares 
among the retailers who were his primary customers, he capitalized on re-
cent technical advances in multicolor printing to issue thousands of splashy, 
full-color chromolithographic trade cards, an innovation that historians of 
advertising regard as an important juncture in the transformation of adver-
tising from a verbal to a visual rnedium.13 
Hostility toward railroad and telegraph corporations was widespread 
in the 1880s, and not only in New York City. Upstate merchants, too, deplored 
the conduct of railroad and telegraph corporations and cried out for relief. The 
meteoric rise of Grover Cleveland from Buffalo mayor in 1881 to U.S. presi-
dent in 1884 built on this popular groundswell. The most critical event in 
Cleveland's rise was his victory as New York governor in 1882, one that 
antimonopolists attributed to his endorsement by merchants disgusted with 
what they derided as the procorporate tilt in state government. Cleveland's 
immediate predecessor as governor, Alonzo Cornell, had been dropped from 
the ticket by Republican P<i-rty leaders for several reasons, including Cornell's 
refusal to veto legislation establishing a permanent railroad commission, a 
reform for which Thurber had diligently lobbied since 1879, and which would 
be duly establish.ed in 1882.14 
Cleveland's tenure as New York governor divided the antimonopolists. 
Some admired his judiciousness in adjudicating the rival claims of corpora-
tions and their critics. Others-including Thurber-criticized Cleveland's ap-
pointees for the railroad commission and expressed outrage at his veto of a 
bill that would have capped at five cents the fare that a Gould-owned elevated 
streetcar line could charge off-peak-time commuters.15 That Gould had bribed 
lawmakers to overturn the will of the people as it had been expressed through 
I, 
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their legislators seemed to Thurber self-evident. Other prominent public fig-
ures concurred. Had it been permissible under U.S. law to issue a bill of at-
tainder to bring Gould to justice without the necessity for a jury trial-or so 
declared the then little-known state assemblyman Theodore Roosevelt, in ex-
plaining why he too endorsed the rate cap-Roosevelt would do so gladly, 
for Gould headed up the "wealthy criminal class" that, through bribery, phys-
ical intimidation, and worse, was insidiously corrupting the political insti-
tutions that lay at the foundation of the Republic. A jury trial would only 
magnify Gould's perfidy: if legal proceedings were conven~d, Gould would 
almost certainly buy off the jurors.16 
To the consternation of his critics, Roosevelt soon changed his mind. 
Cleveland's veto had been entirely proper, he now concluded; since Gould's 
franchise had been granted by a state legislature, the legislature had a legal 
obligation to uphold it. 
Roosevelt was hardly alone. Among the antimonopolists to back Cleve-
land's veto of the five-cent bill was the prominent New York City lawyer 
Simon Sterne. Sterne, a Democrat, wrote widely on public policy topics and 
was the author of a respected history of the U.S. Constitution first published 
in 1882. Sterne's antimonopoly bona fides were unassailable. He had played a 
prominent role in the political crusade that had brought down the notorious 
Tammany boss William Tweed and had testified in support of the establish-
ment of the J'.!ew York railroad commission. Yet Sterne was a lawyer by train-
ing and shared his profession's veneration for legal propriety. Gould's overhead 
railroad operated in accordance with a legal charter, and the legislature lacked 
the authority tCJ alter its terms. 
Cleveland's nomination for president in 1884 did nothing to heal the rift 
in the antimonopolists' ranks. Moderate antimonopolists sided with Sterne 
and endorsed Cleveland as the antimonopoly candidate. Uncompromising 
antimonopolists like Thurber refused. Troubled by the appointments Cleve-
land had made as governor to the state's newly established railroad commis-
sion, and outraged by CleV-eland's five-cent veto, he cast his lot with Butler. 
Thurber's public endorsement of Butler underscored his dissatisfaction 
with Cleveland's tenure as governor. Everything in Cleveland's administra-
tion, in Thurber's view, revealed that his sympathies were "with corporations, 
and not with the people": "If the people want to be ruled by the wealthy crim-
inal_ classes, and if they desire to see the National Government prostituted 
by the lusts of greedy and unscrupulous monopolists, let them vote for Gov. 
Cleveland. If they want honest government and the abolition of monopoly 
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they will poll aheavy and independent vote, and leave Mr. Cleveland out in 
the cold." Only Butler, in Thurber's view, had the fortitude to challenge the 
powers that be: "The rights of labor and the opposition to the monopolies that 
are gaining ground day by day will be the rallying cries of the coming cam-
paign, and the leading parties will learn when it is too late that the people 
are tired of machine misgovernment. There will be a conference of Anti-
Monopolists later this month."17 
Thurber freely conceded that he had voted the Republican ticket in the 
past and that his business partner and brother, H. I<. Thurber, backed Blaine 
in 1884. But he would not. Unlike Butler, and in flagrant defiance of what 
Thurber regarded as the cduntry's democratic heritage, each .of the major party 
candidates preferred to "associate with" and "serve the interests" of the "rich 
and powerful few rather than the many who are poor and weak." It was an 
open secret, in Thurber's view, that corporations had come to wield enormous 
influence over many state governments and had proved equally successful in 
gaining a foothold in Congress: "The condition of thillgs is truly alarming, 
for unless it be changed quickly and thoroughly, free institutions are doomed 
to be subverted by an oligarchy resting upon a basis of money and of corpo-
rate power."18 
Sterne was more measured. Neither Blaine nor Butler, in his view, deserved 
the antimonopolists' vote, since neither candidate had ever" done anything" 
to "entitle him to the confidence of those who desire to see the growing mo-
nopolies curbed." A vote against Cleveland was a vote for Blaine, and Blaine's 
election would be a disaster for the antimonopolists: "[Blaine] dares not, if 
he now would, offend the monopoly powers, who hold the secrets and con-
trolled his actions in the past."19 
In the end, Butler's campaign failed to live up to Thurber's expectations 
or Sterne's fears. Despite a great deal of media hype, Butler polled far fewer 
votes than expected; in fact, in New York he did considerably worse than 
the Prohibition candidate, St. John. No one could deny that the working-
man had grievances, explained one Brooklyn journalist in urging his read-
ership not to bolt for Butler. Yet the electoral math was undeniable: any 
vote for Butler was a vote for Blaine. And the proposition that the workers' 
wrongs could be righted by putting Blaine in the White House, where he 
would be surrounded by a "crew of monopolists, corruptionists, tax eaters," 
and "openly confessed robbers" who had profited from high tariffs, which the 
journalist termed "surplus taxes," was "too manifestly absurd" to be made to 
"intelligent citizens."20 
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While Butler failed, the antimonopolists succeeded. By publicizing the 
challenge posed by the emerging corporate order, they popularized a mor-
ally charged reformist idiom that would shape American electoral politics for 
the next fifty years. "Like light, or air, or water," Thurber explained in a mag-
azine article published in 1875-articulating a theme he would return to in 
the run-up to the election of 1884-steam and electricity were "God's gifts 
to the human race" and "should be possessed and enjoyed by everyone."21 To 
Thurber's chagrin, in 1884, as in 1875, their benefits continJied to be monop-
olized by the few. 
For the antimonopolists the crux of the problem lay in the failure of the 
country's lawmakers to establish the necessary regulatory mechanisms to con-
strain corporate power. The critical dividing line was not rich versus poor; 
rather, it was proprietary capitalism versus corporate capitalism. Thurber's 
own business career was a case in point. The political economy in which 
Thurber had built his business was dominated not by corporations such as 
the New York Central Railroad and Western Union, but rather by proprietor-
ships such as Thurber, Whyland & Company. Thurber had built his fortline 
as a proprietary capitalist, in markets defined by competition, rather than as 
a corporate capitalist, in markets structured by administrative coordination. 
A proprietor might well become wealthy-for Thurber had nothing against 
wealth. This was to be applauded, since he-had earned his "accumulations" 
under the "regulations of the laws of competition," which he could not fix by 
charging an arbitrary price. Corporations, in contrast, set their own prices, 
unconstrained by the discipline of the market.22 Even more disturbingly, they 
had no soul. And for Thurber, this was the nub of the matter. The fathers of 
the American Republic had abolished primogeniture in order to secure the 
country from the "evils" of the accumulation of "vast individual wealth" from 
"generation to generation." Corporations had discovered in their state-granted 
perpetual charters the "elixir of life": "A corporation can neither be hung nor 
sent to the penitentiary; that is to say, there is an entire absence of individual 
responsibility."23 
The New York antimonopolists took it for granted that the recent rise of 
railroad and telegraph corporations owed more to bribery and corruption than 
to technological imperatives and market incentives. Many journalists con-
curred. The exposure of secret dealings made for a good story, and few dis-
closures could top the revelation that a politician had lavished special privileges 
on a corporation in return for inside information, money, or some other valu-
able gift. No other issue-not the tariff, civil service reforn1, Civil War pen-
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sions, or the disenfranchisement of the ex-slaves-offered up as much dramatic 
potential. The principal fault line was not the people versu_s business, as a later 
generation of progressives would contend. Rather, it was business versus mo-
nopoly, a very different polarity. "Monopoly is not business," explained an edi-
torialist in a New York City periodical shortly before the election, in a 
particularly pithy distillation of the conventional wisdom. On the contrary, 
monopoly "kills business": 
The business of the country will probably have a good deal to say on 
election day. It is not the [money] princes who are to do the voting, 
but their somewhat disloyal subjects. It is not the monopolists, but the 
small dealers, the middle men, the men who used to make fair profits 
through the then established principle that opposition is the life of 
trade. Too much of the wealth of this country is in the hands of a score 
of men and too little in the hands of the people. That is the business 
issue that is to be settled now.24 
The likelihood that a public figure would find himself implicated in a cor-
porate corruption scandal was, all things being equal, roughly proportional 
to the length of time he had held public office. And here Cleveland had the 
advantage over Blaine. Cleveland's public career in 1884 was still pretty much 
an open book. Though Cleveland had served one term as a sheriff in 1871, he· 
had held his first major public office-as the mayor ofBuffalo-a mere three 
years before he won the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. Blaine, 
in contrast, had served in Congress from 1863 until 1881i including a six-year 
stint as House Speaker during the Grant administration. By 1884 Blaine had 
generated a long paper trail that could easily be used against him. Particu-
larly damning was a cache of personal letters that Blaine had written to an 
Arkansas railroad contractor during the farmer's tenure as Speaker. These 
letters documented the brazenness with which Blaine bartered political in-
fluence fo"r personal financial gain, a character trait that would haunt him 
throughout the campaign. 
Had this cache of letters never existed, it would not have been surprising 
had some journalist found occasion to invent them. After all, they.fit perfectly 
with what had become by 1884 a widely agreed upon narrative about Blaine. 
Notwithstanding his formidable intelligence, charisma, and ambition, the ex-
congressman turned presidential contender had personally profited during 
his tenure in Congress from the back-room-deals he had struck with railroad 
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lobbyists. The consistency with which Blaine defended the .massive federal 
land grants that Congress had bestowed on railroad corporations since the 
1850s was, for Blaine's critics, compelling evidence that the Republican 
standard-bearer lacked personal integrity and, thus, that all men of conscience, 
regardless of party affiliation, had a moral obligation to deny him the power 
and patronage that he would inevitably command should he defeat Cleve-
land and become president of the United States. 
Blaine's tarnished past posed a formidable dilem:tlla for his fellow Repub-
licans. Some, including the young Theodore Roosevelt, weighed their mis-
givings about Blaine's moral chan,1cter against the personal and political costs 
of bolting the party, and chose the party. 
Others did not. Prominent among the anti-Blaine Republicans were sev-
eral of the most respected journalists in the country, including Carl Schurz 
and E. L. Godkin of the Nation and George William Curtis and Thomas Nast 
of Harper's Weekly . .Troubled by Blaine's moral failings and outraged by the 
railroad land grants for which they held Blaine accountable, these journal-
ists broke party ranks and endorsed Cleveland for president. 
The anti-Blaine Republicans would come to be known as mugwumps, an 
epithet popularized by a pro-Butler New York City j<;>urnalist who did not 
intend it as a compliment. Before 1884, to call someone a mugwump was to 
identify him as a holier-than-thou old-stock Massachusetts blue blood-a self-
regarding group whom Butler had long despised, and who more than returned 
the favor. Whatever its origin, the mugwump label quickly became a badge 
of pride as well as a factor in the campaign. The often fervid oratory of anti-
Blaine Republicans did much to give the Cleveland-Blaine campaign its melo-
dramatic tone, while mugwump journalists churned out reams of anti-Blaine 
editorials and a gallery of visually arresting cartoons. 
Historians long credited the mugwumps' bolt with Blaine's defeat, a con-
clusion that echoed, and was largely based on, the mugwumps' own assess-
ment. Cleveland won the pivotal state of New York by a whisker, and 
mugwumps dominated the editorial page of several influential New York City 
newspapers, including the Times and the Evening Post. If, however, one ana-
lyzes New York's election returns using modern statistical techniques, then 
it would seem plain that this interpretation is mistaken. Blaine, as it happens, 
polled better in 1884 among several pivotal voting blocs than the previous 
Republican presifiential candidate, James Garfield, had in 1880. In fact, Blaine 
outpolled Garfield among Irish Catholics-"rum, romanism, and rebellion" 
notwithstanding. Cleveland, meanwhile, polled more poorly than one would 
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have expected of a Democratic candidate, given the composition of the elec-
torate; indeed, he even failed to carry his hometown of Buffalo.25 
If the mugwumps could not be credited with Blaine's defeat, then who 
could? If any single individual tipped the scales,.it was almost certainly the 
Prohibition Party candidate, john St. john. Had Republican Party leaders pre· 
vailed upon St. John to take himself out of the running in New York, Blaine 
would have obtained many if not most of St. John's twenty-five thousand 
votes-far more than Blaine needed to win the state and the election.26 
While the mugwumps failed to swing the election, they shaped its tone. 
Here, as in so many chapters in American electoral politics, the press took 
the lead. Well-educa'ted, well-bred, and well-mannered, anti-Blaine Repub-
lican journalists penned countless editorials deploring Blaine's venality and 
extolling Cleveland's probity. For the;m, the election became, as-it were, a mo-
rality play in which good and evil battled for the soul of America. In so do-
ing, the mugwumps most emphatically did not strip American electoral 
politics of its raucous emotionality, as twentieth-century historians unfamil-
iar with the narrative conventions of the 1884 presidential campaign have mis-
takenly contended.27 On the contrary, the mugwumps invested it with a 
_burning sense of moral passion. 
To render antimonopoly compel1ing for the masses, journalists devised a 
novel storytel1ing genre that combined words and pictures in a straightfor-
ward dramatic narrative. In so doing, they prefigured the eventual transfor-
mation of the presidential campaign from a faCe-to-face ritual that mobilized 
thousands of partisans in spectacular torchlight parades to a mass-mediated 
spectacle in which a sedentary, though not necessarily passive, citizenry con-
sumed the news in the relative privacy of their homes. 
The journalistic innovations of the 1884 campaign figured prominently 
in i.ts final hectic week. At the behest of party leaders, Blaine agreed to at-
tend a fund-raising dinner on the last Wednesday before the election at Del-
monico's, a swank New York City restaurant. It was a high-risk gambit. In 
an age in which it was unusual for presidential candidates to openly cam-
paign, it was even more unusual for them to appear at public events intended 
to fill the party's coffers. But Republican Party leaders were short of funds, 
and the gregarious Blaine obliged. 
Most campaign funding in this period came not from corporations, but 
rather from wealthy individuals, and, most important of all-at least for the 
party in power-from the assessments that party leaders made from-the sal-
aries of government officials. To mount a credible election campaign in New 
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York City in the 1880s cost at least $100,000, a prodigious sum. Electio:ri Day 
expenses alone ran, _at a minimum, to between $12,000 and ~60,000, the cost 
of printing the ballots that party leaders distributed to their supporte.rs so 
that they could register th.eir preference at the polls.28 Gov_ern~ent-pr1nted 
ballots remained in the future: every ballot in 1884 had to be paid for by one 
of the parties with candidates in the field. This total did not include the cost 
of vote buying, a ubiquitous practice for both the major political pa~ties, or 
the staffing of polling places, a task that also fell primar;_ily to the parties, hav-
ing yet to be absorbed by the state. 
The guest list for Blaine's Delmonico's dinner read like a who's who of New 
York City's movers and shakers. Prominent among them was Ja'. Gaul~, a 
circumstance that seemed highly consequential to several of the JOurnahsts 
who reported on the event. Never before, or so one journalist claimed'. had 
the city's most notorious financial buccaneer fraternized so brazenly with a 
presidential candidate; in fact, the journalist added, it was hard to reca:i mo~e 
than two or three previous occasions during which Gould had dined in 
public.29 
The Delmonico's dinner received wide coverage in the press, almost all 
of it hostile. The fact that Gould would join Blaine for a fund-raiser less than 
one week before the voters went to the polls prompted anti-Blaine journal-
ists to openly warn that the financier was brazenly undertaking to buy t~e 
election. Journalists remembered a similar banquet held a few years earlier 
at which Republican president Chester A. Arthur had reminded his audience 
about how, during the final frantic days of the 1880 presidential campaign, 
the last-minute infusion in Indiana of cash, or what Arthur euphemistically 
called "soap," had clinched the state and the nation for the Republicans. Ar-
thur had toasted,lhe "corruptionists" after the fact; the upcoming dinner would 
honor business moguls intent on "defrauding the nation" by stealing the elec-
tion.30 Five "money kings," including Gould, were alleged to have contrib-
uted $100,000 apiece to Blaine's campaign.31 While it is unlikely that sums 
even remotely this large ever found their way to Republican Party coffers, the 
specter of electoral corruption remained. Gould's speculative coups were leg-
endary and had furnished the theme for countless newspaper stories as well 
as a spate of cartoons, while his uncanny ability to predict th~ future m~ve­
ment of a particular stock had impressed his fellow trad~rs with a combina-
tion of admiration, envy, and horror. How could it be, one reporter asked 
rhetorically, that so many respectable merchants permitted themselves to be 
seen in the company of such a moral reprobate? Why Gould had agreed to 
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dine in public with Blaine seemed obvious. He stood to reap a rich financial 
reward from Blaine's election. Yet why so many honest businessmen had 
agreed to '.'join hands" with Gould by following his example was one of the 
"mysteries of the age."32 
The single most effective piece of journalism to come out of the Delmo-
nico's dinner was a rudimentary black-and-white cartoon drawn by Walt Mc-
Dougall ~nd engraved by Valerian Gribayedoff that ran on page one of the 
pro~Clev,;land New York World on the day after the event (see Figure 3).33 
Entitled The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money I<ings," the 
cartoon features Blaine and Gould at the head of a table of bigwigs, includ-
ing at least one businessm3-n-William H. Vanderbilt-who had not actually 
been .present at the dinner. The confusion over the guest list may stem from 
the circumstances of the cartoon's composition. McDougall was reputed to 
have unsuccessfully pitched a similar idea earlier that summer to the editors 
of the mugwump humor magazine Puck. Following the Delmonico's dinner 
he and Gribayedoff may simply have dusted off his mockup, updated it, and 
readied it for the next day's edition.34 
The Belshazzar's feast conceit was hardly new. The "royal feast" to which 
it referred was an allusion to a legendary banquet in the biblical Book ofDah-
iel in which the soon-to-be-deposed Babylonian tyrant Belshazzar is horri-
fied to watch as a prophecy announcing his imminent doom suddenly 
mate~ializ~s ~n pl.ain view in his banquet hall. Yet McDougall and Gribayedoff 
ga~e It a distinctive twist. As it happens, a considerably more polished anti-
Blaine cartoon by the renowned cartoonist Joseph Keppler on a similar theme 
had run several months earlier in Puck (see Figure 4). In Keppler's cartoon-
entitled, appropriately enough, "The Writing on the Wall"-Blaine-the-King 
cowered behind a copy of the pro-Blaine New York Daily Tribune so that he 
might shield his eyes from the prophetic writing on the wall: "Republican Re-
volt.''.35 In the World cartoon, in contrast, Blaine is confronted not by his Re-
publican detractors, but rather by a humble workingman and his wife and 
child, who silently implore the monopolists to explain why they have been 
denied a place at the table. 
"The Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings" and "Writ-
ing on the Wall" were but two of the many hard-hitting anti-Blaine cartoons 
to b~ featured in the 1884 campaign. While these cartoons differed in many 
particulars, they had two. things in common. Most obviously, they under-
scored Blaine's lack of moral fitness for the presidency, often, as in the World 
cartoon, by emphasizing his subservience to "money kings" like Gould. Harper's 
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Figure 4. "The Writing on the Wall," Puck 15 (June 18, 1885): 199. This artful color 
lithograph by the celebrated political cartoonist Joseph ICeppler dramatized the 
"revolt" within the Republican Party provoked by Blaine's nomination. Try as he 
might, Blaine and his running mate found it impossible to paper over this rift by 
1hiding behind the favorable coverage in the New York Daily Tribune, a newspap·er 
that remained loyal to the Republican Party. Like "The Royal Feast of Belshazzar 
Blaine," it was based on a biblical story. I<eppler assumed that his readership would 
make the connection and recall that the writing on the wall-"Republican 
Revolt" -was a harbinger of doom. 
Weekly cartoonist Thomas Nast prov~~ ·particularly effective at exploring 
this dimension of Blaine's candidacy. rn one cartoon, for example, Nast de-
picted Blaine as a gifted magician who relied on sleight of hand to fool the 
voters into regarding him as morally fit; in another Blaine became a medieval 
knight, chasing after the "public purse" in the "railroad ring."36 A second theme 
that·these cartoons had in common was their marked pro-proprietary, an-
ticorporate bias. Corporate kingpins like Vanderbilt and Gould were propri-
etary capitalists gone to seed. At their most harmless, they clogged the channels 
of commerce; at their worst, they were actively conspiring to destroy the 
Republic. 
By far the ffiost artful and elaborate of the anti-Blaine political cartoons 
ran in Puck, a weekly mass circulation humor magazine that featured three 
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full-page multicolor chromolithographs in every issue. While Puck cartoon-
ists caricatured Blaine in various unflattering ways, the conceit that made the 
greatest hit with audiences was the transmogrification of the candidate into 
the tattooed man, a sideshow attraction at a "dime museum" whom the pro-
moter had put on display to satisfy the curiosity of spectators eager to learn 
about his sordid past. 
The tattooed man had by 1884 become a familiar figure in popular cul-
ture. The original was a sideshow attraction whose body.a savage oriental tribe 
had covered from head to foot with images of birds, :fishes, and snakes. Like 
the body of the man in the sideshow attraction, Blaine's had been festooned 
with tattoos; unlike the tattooed man, however-at least, if one believed the 
showman's hype-Blaine's tattoos were self-inflicted and consisted of a cata-
logue of his dubious financial dealings.
37 
Few accounts of the 1884 election fail to mention its iconic political car-
toons, yet almost never do they recognize them for what they were: a highly 
effective and largely novel medium for mobilizing public sentiment and ar-
ticulating shared values. The political cartoon antedated 1884. Yet rarely be-
fore had it ~gured so prominently in public discourse or in popularizing highly 
polarizing-and, indeed, cartoon-lilce-archetypes: the "robber baron," the 
"politico." These archetypes would live on long after the issues that agitated 
contemporaries in 1884 had been forgotten. Indeed, to a remarkable degree 
they would remain staples of journalistic discourse about government-business 
relations for the next fifty years, and have been by no means entirely sup-
planted as a journalistic convention even today. 
The influence of the political cartoon on the 1884 presidential campaign 
can partly be explained by recent technical advances in high-speed printing. 
The mechanical reproduction of woodcuts was, of course, old hat. Prior to 
the 1880s, however, their preparation ordinarily took at least two full days, 
making it hard for cartoonists to respond to rapidly unfolding events. "The 
Royal Feast of Belshazzar Blaine and the Money ICings," in contrast, was read-
ied for the press in a mere two hours and would hit the newsstands the fol-
lowing day. Technical advances hastened the demand for new images, further 
increasing their proliferation. In 1880 only a handful of newspapers featured 
political cartoons with any regularity; a decade later, or so Gribayedoff would 
boast in a retrospective essay on the rise of "pictorial journalism," the total 
had increased to over five thousand.38 Gribayedoff exaggerated. Not until the 
opening decades of the twentieth centurywould the political cartoon become 
a ubiquitous feature of the popular press. Even so, he was on the mark in un-
Markets, Morality, and the Media 93 
derscoring the rapidly growing presence of the . . . p~rsd~:!:::i%~mall, ahnd not merely in trailblaz~r~l~~:;ea!::~::n;::~;~~~ 
ograp y was an even more funda 1 . 
The mass publication of multicol . menta technical advance. 
and the 1884 presidential electio: ~:sa;~: ~::ti~ 18~~ l~ss tha~ a decade old, 
City-based humor magazines p ) d n w ic two rival New York 
rival candidates. ' uc can Judge, ran dueling cartoons to bo_ost 
Tue highly conspicuous role th t th I' . 
1884 presidential campaign is a po~nt ~po. i~1c~l cartoon would play in the 
tion th<it the mugwumps h d . 1 . el reJoin er to the oft-voiced conten-
a a pr1ncip ed aversion t 1 
. mugwump periodical 'so too w H ' o spectac e. Puck was a 
sion out of electoral p' olit1·cs thas arper s Weekly. Instead of taking the pas-
' e mugwumps inJ· t d · h . 
campaign an insistent moralism t d . ec e into t e presidential 
. 'roo e ill the worldvi f · 
italism, which translated often reco d"t . ew o proprietary cap-n I e issues into vi 11 . . 
agery that fascinated contemporaries and remai d sua y comp~lhng im-
of an often forgotten election. ns to ay an enduring legacy 
* * * 
Tue 1884 presidential election had e d , 
American journalism, but also for th: ~::;. consequenc~s not only for 
victory,·the Republican Party lost control of th ica; s:a~e. w_ith Cleveland's 
the. federal government for the fi t t' . ea ministrative apparatus of 
paradoxically-since parties i·n rs Ime sindc~ 1861, a significant shift that, 
power are or inaril l th t . 
tronage that is at their <lisp s 1 1 y oa_ o give up the pa-
0 a -acce erated the e f 
nonpartisan civil service in several fede 1 . mergence o a permanent, 
Department and the Post Offi D ra agencies, including the Treasury 
ce epartment Now th t th D 
in power, they too had an ince t' t · a e emocrats were 
be dismissed from office shou~d1~~ o;nsu~~· that their supporters would not 
-around .. For if there was one str te elpu icans defeat them the next time 
uc ura constant in u s t · 1 . 
was the inevitability of the next . d . 1 · · na iona politics, it 
•an electoral defeat would pose /resi en:ia delection and the challenge that 
of the levers of power Byexpa d~r p:~ty ea ers intent on retaining control 
ered by the Pendleto~ Act (18:3)mgd e number of federal officeholders cov· 
. · an , even more 1mporta tl b h . 
1ngthevirtuesoffrugal honest d. . 1 n y, ye amp1on-
lay the foundation no; only f~ra~he l~~r~a ~~~lie servic~, Cle~eland helped 
but also for the emergence in l t d d_ sta ished during his presidency, 
,.of the modern regulatory state.a er eca es of the administrative apparatus 
94 
Richard R.John 
"Liberty, Equality, Honesty!" trumpeted the headline for a page one car-
toon by Walt McDougall that the World ran immediately following Cleve-
land's victory in 1884 (see Figure 5). McDougall, of course, was hardly 
impartial. Yet by depicting Cleveland as a morally upstanding statesman who 
had slain the "monopoly" serpent, he cast the spotlight on a dimension of 
the president's victory that was evident to contemporaries, yet that would be 
later forgotten. In the popular imagination, Blaine had much closer ties than 
Cleveland to the emerging corporate order, making Cli;;veland's victory a de-
feat not only for a political party, but also for the developmental vision that 
the Republican Party embraced. To make sure that no one missed the point, 
McDougall took pains, in the caption accompanying his cartoon, to spell out 
the moral: "The Government Again Belongs to the People and Not to Cor-
rupt Monopolists."39 
For most Americans in 1884, the corporation remained an exotic bit of 
flotsam in a sea of proprietorships. It was, thus, perhaps not surprising that 
the antimonopoly critique spearheaded by Thurber and Sterne would shape 
the legislative agenda of the Democratic Party's congressional leadership dur-
ing the first Cleveland administration. The reason was simple. New York re-
mained a swing state in the 1888 presidential election, elevating the importance 
of voting blocs that were not firmly committed to a particular political party. 
Democratic Party leaders well understood the extent to which their par-
ty's future remained beholden to highly motivated, if numerically small, vot-
ing blocs such as the New York antimonopolists, and proceeded accordingly. 
Thurber and Sterne each received an invitation to testify before Congress on 
the merits of commission regulation, and their voices were heard. The Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887 led to the establishment of the ICC, a federal 
agency with a broad mandate to ensure that railroad corporations did not 
abuse their power over rate setting. The rec is sometimes assumed to have 
been a new departure. In fact, it built on several decades' experience at the 
state level and was directly modeled on the New York railroad commission 
for which Thurber and Sterne had lobbied since 1879, and which the New York 
legislature had enacted in 1882. 
The solicitude ofD'emocratic Party leaders for a permanent railroad com-
mission represented a major compromise within the party's ranks. The Demo-
cratic congressional delegation in the 1880s included a large and vocal bloc 
of southerners who opposed the establishment of a permanent railroad com-
missiOn as a dangerous augmentation in the administrative capacity of the 
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highly punitive railroad law championed by Texas Democrat John H. Rea-
gan that mandated heavy criminal and civil penalties for the violation of its 
provisions and left its adjudication to the state courts. In the end, however, 
the New Yorkers prevailed and Reagan lost.40 
Mindfril of the imperatives of electoral politics, Democratic Party lead-
ers subordinated a proposal that had broad support among the party's own 
congressional delegation to a minority proposal championed by the New York 
antimonopolists. The only significant concession th~t :earty leaders made to 
Reagan concerned the ban on pooling-and even here, it was the exception 
that proved the rule. On this issue, the New York antimonopolists were di-
vided: Sterne favored pooling; Thurber did not. 
Reagan's defeat is sometimes lamented by political scientists sympathetic 
to the anticommission, small-government antimonopolism that Democratic 
Party leaders rejected. Yet it is worth recalling that Reagan's proposal pre-
supposed the same states' rights orthodoxy that had hastened the disenfran-
chisement of thousands of African Americans and that would remain an 
impediment to social justice until it would be finally be overturned by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Reagan's favored regulatory mechanism-the state 
courts-was, after all, the same institution that had proved so effective in 
maintaining the racial status quo. For southern antimonopolists, any aug-c 
mentation in the administrative capacity of the federal government raised 
the terrifying prospect that future lawmakers might threaten the Democratic 
Party's one-party monopoly in the South. 
Blaine's defeat in 1884 was in no sense a rejection of the emerging corpo-
rate order. Yet it does raise questions about the commonplace characteriza-
tion of the post-Civil War decades as a so-called Gilded Age. The "Gilded 
Age" catchphrase assumes that the period was uµusually sordid, selfish, and 
corrupt. Yet was it? The phrase itself would not become widely used until 
after World War I, long after the period had ended. By that time, the anti-
monopoly political economy of Thurber and Sterne had been supplanted by 
the progressive political economy of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wil-
son. In the antimonopoly political econoiny, personal morality remained a 
core value. In the progressive political economy, in contrast, personal mo-
rality had given way to the moral claims of technological imperatives and 
economic growth. Might then it n'ot be time to relegate the Gilded Age label 
to the historiographical scrap heap and to acknowledge the extent to which 
the 1880s were, in ways that have too often been underappreciated, an age of 
reform?41 
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Thurber himself lived long enough to reflect on this shift. Financially ru-
ined by the Panic of 1893, he retooled as a lawyer and spent the final years of 
his life as a lobbyist for the U.S. Export Association. Contemporaries erred, 
Thurber reflected in 1897, when they personified giant corporations as the 
? personal fiefdoms of grasping monopolists. On the contrary, these corpora-
.'· tions, ,including those that had consolidated into trusts, should be lauded for 
\ their co1:1tribution to national prosperity: "The wholesale denunciation of 
Trusts is the denunciation of an economic evolution which is conferring enor-
mous benefits upon the community in general." To explain why these wrong-
headed ideas retained such currency, Thurber pointed his finger squarely at 
the "one-cent sensation'al journalism" of the country's mass-circulation big-
city newspapers.42 "Many good people have imagined a bogey monster that 
doesn't exist," Thurber elaborated two years later, in a pointed defense of the 
economic benefits of corporate consolidation. "They have accepted as facts 
. the fancies of sensational journalism." In fact, the corporation had substan-
tially cheapened the cost of goods and services, making it the most efficient 
economic institution in the history of the world.43 
Thurber's mea culpa provides a perspective not only on the shifting char-
acter of the U.S. political economy, but also on the world that was lost. The 
1884 .election campaign had been fought in a world that remained defined 
by the market-oriented ethos of proprietary capitalism. Campaign funding 
continued to be dominated, as it had been in every campaign since Andrew 
Jackson entered the White House in 1829, by the contribution of wealthy in-
dividuals and the assessment of government officials. The influx of corpo-
rate money remained in the future. In fact, the specter that financiers like 
William. H. Vanderbilt and Jay Gould might flood the coffers of the Repub-
lican P.lrty-the subtext for the popular coverage of Blaine's Delmonico's 
dinner-inspired an outpouring of revulsion not only from journalists, but 
.:'also from hlany businessmen. The new media of the day-including, in par-
ticular, ·the chromolithographic political cartoon-combined a high-toned 
ethic of personal moral responsibility with an almost Manichean good-versus-
bad proprietary-corporate dialectic. The corporate capitalism of Vanderbilt 
8.nd Gould pointed to the future, and it was a future that in 1884 the Ameri-
'can people rejected when, by the narrowest of margins, they cast their bal-
10ts 'for. Cleveland rather than Blaine. 
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